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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2007, Nassim Nicholas Taleb published a groundbreaking book, The Black 
Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable.1 Since then, interest in the subject 
both inside and outside academia has been increasing exponentially. Nobel 
laureate and researcher in human cognitive biases in probability judgment, Daniel 
Kahneman, has said, “Taleb has changed the way many people think about 
uncertainty, … His book, The Black Swan, is an original and audacious analysis 
of the ways in which humans try to make sense of unexpected events".2 
Previously, the term, “Black Swan,” had been used by philosophers of science to 
illustrate the problem of induction. Originally Europeans thought all swans were 
white, until they discovered Australia. Hence, the first black swan that they saw 
down-under had refuted the all-swans-are-white theory that was based on 
hundreds of years of empirical confirmation.  In The Black Swan, Taleb talks 
about the dangers that arise when (a) we are faced with rare-probability events 
and (b) we attempt to explain them. In a nutshell, a Black Swan situation happens 
when three things come together – a rare event, a severe outcome, and a flawed 
explanation. According to Taleb, the world we live in is becoming more 
intertwined and complex and the rare events in economics, finance, and the 
business world are occurring with a higher frequency. On the other hand, human 
beings’ natural curiosity always demands an explanation when an extremely rare 
or never-before-occurred phenomenon takes place. Unfortunately, as Daniel 
Kahneman has repeatedly demonstrated,3 our explanations of probability are often 
biased and highly inaccurate. Nassim Taleb’s The Black Swan opened a Pandora’s 
box of research into the subject and its application in different areas. In this paper, 
I apply it to religious giving. 
 Previous research shows that average church contribution amounts vary 
between denominations.4 It has also been demonstrated that the giving 
distributions are skewed to the right.5 On the other hand, recent history has 
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uncovered numerous financial misdemeanors in churches.6 I will add to the 
existing research by examining the distributions of giving amounts in churches 
within a more rigorous statistical framework. I will also consider the giving 
distribution's behavior, together with a biased perception of probability, as 
possible contributing factors to the crisis.  
 I will begin by estimating the exact statistical distributions of the five 
denominations in our study. I will show that the distributions are statistically 
different between the denominations. I will point out the flaws in the cognitive 
perception of the giving probabilities from the severity and frequency 
perspectives and its implication to the embezzlement in churches.  
 
DATA 
 
The religious contributions data is from the American Congregational Giving 
Study, 1993.  The data provides the individual church members' answers to the 
following question: "During the last year, approximately how much money did 
your household contribute to your church, in regular giving (not including school 
tuition or contributions to a capital campaign)? Include the value of material 
goods, as well as monetary gifts." The following five denominations’ members 
were questioned: Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist Convention, Roman 
Catholic Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church of America, and the U.S. 
Presbyterian Church. A total of 125 congregations from each of the five 
denominations, and 30 randomly selected members from each of the 625 
congregations contributed to the survey.  
 
A SHORT REVIEW OF CHURCH GIVING 
 
In the United States, 90% of the people annually give money to charity, with 
personal giving growing faster than the gross domestic product (GDP) in the last 
decade.7 Today private giving represents more than 2% of the GDP.8 About a 
third of the total money contributed to charity is given to religious organizations9. 
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In 1994 Dean Hoge summarized the research in religious giving in the following 
five key points: “1) Religious giving is a rational behavior and can be modeled 
using existing sociological and economic methods. 2) People strongly committed 
to God and God's promises will give more to the church. 3) Church members who 
have more discretionary income will, on average, give more to the church. 4) The 
distribution of the amount of money given by members of any church is highly 
skewed—the majority of a church's money comes from a minority of its members. 
5) The amount of money potentially available to churches from members is a 
variable, not a fixed sum”.10 Moreover, it has been found that middle income 
individuals give less than the poorest and the wealthiest when the contributions 
are measured as a percentage of income.11 
 As has already been noted, giving amounts differ between 
denominations.12 However, no inference was made from a statistical point of view 
as to the differences between the distributions of giving among the 
denominations. I invoke the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) two-sample test13 in 
order to test the hypothesis that the denominational distributions are in fact 
different. The KS test results are presented in Table 1. They show that there is no 
statistical evidence, based on the 99.9% level of confidence, that regular 
contribution amounts at stake were sampled from the same distribution—i.e., that 
the giving amounts are identically distributed for the five denominations in our 
study. 
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Moreover, although it has been repeatedly pointed out by other studies14 that the 
distribution of individual giving is skewed to the right, this aspect did not provide 
for the exact statistical character of the giving distribution. In this paper I estimate 
a statistical distribution that best describes the giving data. It is true that the 
amount given is highly correlated with income. Hence it is tempting to assume 
that the giving and income distributions will have similar shapes. However, 
because the share of income given in churches is not constant, but increases with 
income over a certain amount,15 the distribution of giving will be heavier-tailed 
than the distribution of income. In order to estimate the statistical distribution of 
the giving amounts, I fit non-negative distributions to the data via the maximum 
likelihood method. The MathWave EasyFit 3.3 software allows for fitting the 
following non-negative and advanced densities: Erlang, exponential, fatigue life, 
Frechet, gamma, inverse Gaussian, log-logistic, lognormal, Pareto, Rayleigh, 
Weibull, generalized extreme value, generalized logistic, generalized pareto, and 
Wakeby. The goodness-of-fit Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling tests 
(the Anderson-Darling values provided by MathWave are fixed for all 
distributions) both show that Wakeby distribution fits the data best. In fact, it is 
                                                 
14
 Dean Hoge, "Introduction”; Zech, et. al., Money Matters; R. Iannaccone, "Skewness explained: 
A rational choice model of religious giving," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 36, no. 
2 (1997): 141-157. 
15
 Schervish and Havens, "Explaining the curve in the U-shaped curve"; Russell and Sharpe, "The 
nature and causes of the U-shaped charitable giving profile." 
 
Table 1
Southern 
Baptist Catholic ELCA Presbyterian
Assemblies of God 1.989 13.957 10.096 8.072
Southern Baptist 11.902 7.943 5.884
Catholic 4.635 6.936
ELCA 2.388
Level of significance 0.05 0.025 0.01 0.001
Critical values 1.36 1.48 1.63 1.95
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics
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the only distribution with any non-rejection hypothesis results (see Tables 2 and 
3). 
 
 
 
Table 2 (a) Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness  of fit s tatis tics
Distribution Statis tic Rank Statis tic Rank Statis tic Rank Statis tic Rank Statis tic Rank
Wakeby 0.0357 1 0.0330 1 0.0441 1 0.0385 1 0.0374 1
Gamma 0.0469 2 0.0463 4 0.1032 9 0.0572 4 0.0812 8
Gen. Extreme Value 0.0502 3 0.0506 6 0.0611 4 0.0572 5 0.0522 3
Weibull 0.0513 4 0.0456 3 0.0934 7 0.0501 3 0.0647 6
Gen. Logis tic 0.0555 5 0.0618 8 0.0535 2 0.0680 8 0.0599 5
Gen. Pareto 0.0614 6 0.0464 5 0.0822 5 0.0455 2 0.0551 4
Exponential 0.0635 7 0.0412 2 0.0964 8 0.0591 7 0.0844 9
Log-Logis tic 0.0746 8 0.0603 7 0.0581 3 0.0584 6 0.0442 2
Lognormal 0.1102 9 0.0912 9 0.0825 6 0.0824 9 0.0686 7
Inv. Gaussian 0.1278 10 0.1148 10 0.2293 12 0.1028 10 0.1383 11
Fatigue Life 0.1412 11 0.1425 11 0.1311 10 0.1203 11 0.1309 10
Frechet 0.1730 12 0.1753 12 0.1562 11 0.1401 12 0.1542 12
Rayleigh 0.1978 13 0.2297 13 0.2628 13 0.2738 13 0.2875 13
Table 2 (b) Anderson-Darling goodness  of fit s tatis tics
Distribution Statis tic Rank Statis tic Rank Statis tic Rank Statis tic Rank Statis tic Rank
Wakeby 1.3265 1 1.3978 1 2.2131 1 1.7521 1 4.7721 2
Gen. Extreme Value 5.4768 2 5.8528 2 3.6712 3 8.3287 2 4.5248 1
Gen. Logis tic 7.0090 3 8.6078 3 2.7074 2 12.035 3 6.4212 3
Weibull 42.764 4 72.985 5 78.291 8 78.254 4 86.557 4
Exponential 44.079 5 72.149 4 74.753 5 80.522 6 93.444 7
Log-Logis tic 61.388 6 93.994 7 68.467 4 93.763 7 88.695 5
Lognormal 70.429 7 100.40 8 76.728 6 99.138 8 93.471 8
Gamma 42.514 8 73.877 6 77.165 7 80.338 5 91.499 6
Fatigue Life 105.69 9 152.03 9 125.41 9 140.06 9 164.32 9
Frechet 137.37 10 171.40 10 162.81 10 177.83 10 186.66 11
Inv. Gaussian 147.14 11 203.67 12 210.61 11 252.14 12 178.08 10
Rayleigh 262.34 12 368.76 13 421.06 12 597.50 13 656.06 13
Gen. Pareto 303.78 13 199.08 11 508.22 13 241.10 11 403.88 12
Catholic ULCA Presbyterian
Presbyterian
of God Baptis t
Assemblies Southern
Assemblies
of God
Southern
Baptis t Catholic ULCA
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The Wakeby distribution is most easily defined as an inverse distribution 
function: 
 
))1(1())1(1()( δβ
δ
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α
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Table 3 Wakeby distribution ML goodness of fit tests' results
Sample Goodness of Test
Denomination size fit test* statistic 0.15 0.1 0.05 0.01
Assembiles of God 1,673     K-S 0.03570 0.02787 0.02983 0.03325 0.03985
A-D 1.32650 1.60240 1.92860 2.50180 3.90740
Southern Baptist 1,650     K-S 0.03299 0.02806 0.03003 0.03348 0.04013
A-D 1.39780 1.60240 1.92860 2.50180 3.90740
Catholic 1,966     K-S 0.04406 0.02571 0.02751 0.03067 0.03676
A-D 2.21310 1.60240 1.92860 2.50180 3.90740
ULCA 2,214     K-S 0.03852 0.02423 0.02593 0.02890 0.03464
A-D 1.75210 1.60240 1.92860 2.50180 3.90740
Presbyterian 2,205     K-S 0.03735 0.02428 0.02598 0.02896 0.03471
A-D 4.77210 1.60240 1.92860 2.50180 3.90740
* K-S (Kolmogorov- Smirnov)
   A-D (Anderson-Darling)
Critical values by level of significance
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Previous studies have suggested the applicability of the Wakeby distribution to 
the analysis of flood behavior,16 other hydrologic phenomena,17 and extreme 
events in general.18  Many homeowners know, however, that their homeowner's 
insurance generally does not cover flooding. “Because of the catastrophic nature 
of flooding and the difficulty of adequately predicting flood risks,…private 
insurance companies have largely been unwilling to underwrite and bear the risk 
of flood insurance”.19  The similarity of giving distribution to flooding 
distribution is crucial. Rejection of all common thin-tailed, easy-to-model 
distributions in favor of Wakeby raises the level of uncertainty regarding the tail 
events. The Wakeby distribution with the estimated parameters is fat-tailed—i.e., 
it has no moments, and its hazard rate, defined as   
	

, is decreasing—
i.e. lim   0. The lack of moments prevents the aggregate data from 
converging to normal distribution via the Central Limit Theorem. For churches 
this means that their aggregate income from voluntary giving cannot be estimated 
by the thin-tailed Gaussian model. The decreasing hazard rate demonstrates the 
counter-intuitive phenomenon of an increasing probability of exceeding a certain 
value as the conditional value increases. Mathematically, it implies the following: 
 
lim

Pr    |    1 
                                                 
16
 J.C. Houghton, "Birth of a parent: the Wakeby distribution for modeling flood flows," Water 
Resources Research, 14 (1978): 1105-1110. 
17
 Landwehr, J. M., N. C. Matalas, and J. R. Wallis, "Quantile estimation with more or less 
floodlike distributions," Water Resources Research 16 (1980): 547-555. 
18
 Jeong-Soo Park, Hyun-Sook Jung,  Rae-Seon Kim, and Jai-Ho Oh, "Modeling summer extreme 
rainfall over the Korean peninsula using Wakeby distribution," International Journal of 
Climatology 21, no. 11 (2001) : 1371-1384. 
19
 Williams, O., "Federal Emergency Management Agency: Ongoing challenges facing the 
National Flood Insurance Program," Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs. U.S. Senate, October 2, 2007. 
 
Table 4 Wakeby distribution parameter estimates
Denomination α β γ δ ζ
Assembiles of God 3,274.40    0.587 292.05       0.609 -58.015
Southern Baptist 2,174.20    0.430 469.09       0.443 -53.211
Catholic 888.27       2.466 303.48       0.483 -6.418
ULCA 354.37       2.314 870.42       0.199 -17.102
Presbyterian 696.58       1.418 721.01       0.403 -0.315
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 Applying this logic to churches, this means that if there is a donor who gives over 
M dollars, the expected amount by which his actual donation is greater than M is 
going to increase as we assume larger and larger M. Whatever our intuition 
expects the actual amount donated to be, it is likely to be higher, as we assume 
higher conditional value—i.e., when it rains, it pours. 
 The above observations have pointed out the counter-intuitive situation 
regarding the size of the potential donation. Now we will see that the frequency of 
the occurrence of tail events can also be severely misjudged due to the cognitive 
biases. In a paper published in 1974, Tversky and Kahneman provide a list of 
cognitive biases that make our judgment of probability inadequate. Two 
observations from that paper are applicable to our scenario: the sample size bias 
and the disjoint event bias. According to Tversky and Kahneman, “The similarity 
of a sample statistic to a population parameter does not depend on the size of the 
sample. Consequently, if probabilities are assessed by representativeness, then the 
judged probability of a sample statistic will be essentially independent of sample 
size.”20 This means that humans will erroneously expect the same probabilities of 
tail events, regardless of the size of the sample. Church members will expect 
voluntary giving income in small congregations to deviate similarly to that in 
large congregations. Actually, it will be more likely for the voluntary giving 
income to spike in smaller congregations than in larger ones. Church 
administrators should anticipate this phenomenon, especially because the spike 
size or the actual amount of the excessive donation, as I showed previously, is 
counter-intuitive and is likely to be much larger than expected. The lack of 
awareness of such peculiarities of giving behavior in smaller congregations 
creates an environment in which spiked income, unaccountable by intuition, can 
be hard to trace.  
 Another cognitive bias discussed by Tversky and Kahneman deals with 
our evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events. An example of a conjunctive 
event would be drawing a red marble seven times in a row with replacement from 
a bag containing 90% red and 10% white marbles. A disjunctive event would be 
drawing a red marble at least once in seven successive trials from a bag 
containing 10% red and 90% white marbles. It has been demonstrated that people 
tend to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events and to underestimate 
the probability of disjunctive events.21 If we apply this conclusion to churches, we 
can state that in larger congregations, people will underestimate the probability of 
having at least one high giving donor. Because the probability of having one high 
                                                 
20
 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases," 
Science New Series 185, no. 4157 (1974): p. 1125. 
21
 Ibid. 
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giver is small, people erroneously "anchor" the negligent chance and discard the 
number of trials. The probability of the occurrence of a substantially large 
donation will be underestimated in the congregation. This creates a gap between 
the expected number of high givers and the actual number, for which the 
difference is unaccountable by intuition. 
 In a survey by the Center for the Study of Church Management at 
Villanova's School of Business, 85% of U.S. Catholic dioceses responding said 
they had uncovered embezzlement schemes over the past five years. More than 
10% reported the amounts stolen exceeded half a million dollars.22 The main 
issues believed to be responsible for financial mismanagement inside churches are 
lack of transparency and lack of internal controls.23 However, in the fat-tailed 
stochastic environment prone to cognitive biases, transparency and internal 
controls alone are not sufficient to solve the financial problems. In a poor-
transparency environment, the excess of the actual amount donated over the 
amount intuitively expected is unaccountable by the books; in a robust-
transparency environment, it is unaccountable by intuition.  The Black Swans in 
churches are the situations of extremely high amounts of giving, whose expected 
size and probability are severely misjudged due to cognitive biases. The lack of 
awareness of such phenomenon in church congregations creates an opacity which 
has the full potential to disguise money misappropriations. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In situations where income is highly stochastic, as it is in churches, it is vital to 
have an idea of the statistical distribution that can describe the underlying 
stochastic process. Previous studies have shown that giving amounts in churches 
differ between denominations, and that the giving distributions are skewed to the 
right. To these observations I add that the giving distributions are different 
between denominations, and that they are best described by a fat-tailed Wakeby.  
 Cognitive biases also play an important role in the stochastic environment. 
I show that applying the conclusions presented by Tversky and Kahneman24 
regarding the intuitive heuristics to churches will expose gaps between the 
                                                 
22
 David Gibson, "Keeping an eye on the collection plate: The Catholic Church tries better 
financial oversight," Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2007. 
23
 John B. Duncan, "Internal control systems in US churches, an examination of the effect of 
church size and denomination on systems of internal control," Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 12, no. 2 (1999): 142-163. 
24
 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases," 
Science New Series 185, no. 4157 (1974): 1124-1131. 
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expected and actual probabilities of spiked income in small congregations, and 
between the expected and actual number of potential high-givers in large 
congregations. The fat tails of the donation amounts' distribution make the true 
probabilities of large donations counter-intuitive as well. In the stochastic 
environment, such as in churches’ cash flows, transparency will not prevent 
intuition from making judgment errors; thus, transparency alone will not solve the 
financial problems. Therefore, awareness should be raised regarding the 
possibility of Black Swan situations, which emerge due to the nature of the giving 
distribution and the human bias in probability judgment.  
 
 
10
Journal of Religion and Business Ethics, Vol. 2 [2010], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jrbe/vol2/iss1/3
